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TAXING SUNNY DAYS:  
ADJUSTING TAXES FOR REGIONAL  
LIVING COSTS AND AMENITIES 
Michael S. Knoll∗ and Thomas D. Griffith∗∗ 
he federal income tax code does not adjust individuals’ tax burdens for 
differences in regional living costs.  Thus, a married couple with an an-
nual income of $100,000 will pay the same amount in federal income tax — 
and thus have the same after-tax income — whether they live in New York 
City or Atlanta.  However, because the cost of living is higher in New 
York,1 the Atlanta family will enjoy a better standard of living.2  To 
achieve the same standard of living, the New York family would not only 
have to earn more to cover their higher living costs, but also, because per-
sonal living expenses are generally not deductible,3 they would have to 
earn more to cover the additional taxes they would owe on their higher earn-
ings.4  Ordinary citizens often view this state of affairs as unfair and sug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Real Estate, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton 
School. 
 ∗∗ John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation, University of Southern California Law School.  
Thanks to Linda Beres, David Bradford, Charlotte Crane, Jeff Gordon, Bruce Johnsen, Louis Kaplow, 
Deborah Paul, Dan Shaviro, Reed Shuldiner, audiences at Cardozo, George Mason, Georgetown, 
Northwestern, NYU, Penn, Toronto, Vanderbilt, and Virginia Law Schools, and at the Schulich and 
Wharton Schools of Business, and participants at the Harvard and Southern California Tax Policy 
Seminars.  We also thank Al Dong, Peter Sanchez, and Dara Zweig for their assistance with the re-
search. 
 1 The cost of living in New York City is more than double that in Atlanta.  See infra Appendix I, 
pp. 1021–23. 
 2 This assumes that a taxpayer’s “standard of living” does not include the consumption value, if 
any, of living in New York rather than in Atlanta.  Consumption “amenities,” which might reduce or 
eliminate apparent differences in living standards, are described in Part VII, infra pp. 1007–17. 
 3 I.R.C. § 262(a) (2000).  There are some exceptions, including, for example, medical expenses in 
excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income (AGI), I.R.C. § 213(a), and casualty losses in excess of 10% 
of AGI, I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h)(2). 
 4 Why living costs differ across regions and the relationship between differences in living costs and 
productivity are discussed in Part I, infra pp. 989–93. 
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gest that personal income taxes should be adjusted for differences in re-
gional living costs by assessing tax on a taxpayer’s “real” income.5 
Tax commentators are less sure.  Their intuition is that no adjustment is 
necessary because there is no unfairness.  They reason that although tax-
payers in high-cost regions earn more and so pay higher nominal taxes, the 
real value of their incomes and tax burdens (measured by the goods and 
services they could otherwise purchase with their tax dollars) is generally 
no higher than that of taxpayers in low-cost regions.  Viewed in terms of 
ability to pay,6 taxpayers are treated no differently based on their locations, 
and thus there is no need for adjustments.7 
In our view, fairness arguments — either for or against adjusting the 
tax burden to account for differences in regional living costs — are uneasy 
at best because competition from interregional migration tends to eliminate 
differences in living standards for individuals with similar skills and 
drive.8  The tendency for migration to eliminate interregional differences in 
living standards robs ability-to-pay arguments of their moral force on the 
question of how the tax burden should be distributed across regions.9 
Ability to pay, however, is not the full story.  In this Article, we show 
that the failure to adjust individuals’ tax liabilities for different regional 
living costs misallocates capital and labor throughout the economy, dis-
couraging investment and employment in high-cost regions and encourag-
ing it in low-cost regions.10  Thus, to eliminate a tax-induced bias against 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See, e.g., David A. Levy, Index Federal Income Taxes, NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1993, at 66 
(describing a bill he introduced in Congress in 1993 that would have indexed federal income tax 
rate brackets to regional costs of living by imposing a tax on each taxpayer’s gross income divided by 
his local cost of living); Zoe Lofgren, Government Shouldn’t Tax Income Before You Get It, 
SAN JOSE BUS. J., Apr. 16, 2001, http://sanjose.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2001/04/16/ 
editorial3.html (arguing that the tax code discriminates against taxpayers in regions with high costs of 
living because tax credits and other benefits are less valuable to them than they are to taxpayers in re-
gions with low costs of living).  The only explicit concession in the federal income tax to differences in 
living costs across regions is the per diem allowance for unsubstantiated expenses incurred by govern-
ment employees while on temporary assignment away from home.  The allowance is greater for regions 
with a higher cost of living.  See General Services Administration, 
Domestic Per Diem Rates, at http://www.policyworks.gov/perdiem (last visited Jan. 11, 2003). 
 6 “Ability to pay” is the principle that the tax burden should be distributed according to individu-
als’ capacities to contribute to the collective good.  See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE 
INCOME TAX 150 (1986). 
 7 Perhaps it is because of their intuition that the status quo’s treatment of differences in regional liv-
ing costs is correct that there has been so little serious analysis of the income tax consequences of cost-
of-living differences.  A notable exception is an excellent recent article, Louis Kaplow, Regional Cost-
of-Living Adjustments in Tax/Transfer Schemes, 51 TAX L. REV. 175 (1996).  However, because Profes-
sor Kaplow assumes a static economy with no market adjustments, see id. at 183, he does not consider 
the tax system’s impact on total productivity, which is the focus of our analysis. 
 8 This is so regardless of how tax burdens are distributed across regions. See infra Part II, pp. 993–
95. 
 9 Where migration in both directions is not sufficient to eliminate differences in living standards, 
such as across income classes, ability-to-pay arguments might still have force. 
 10 See infra Part IV, pp. 997–1000. 
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high-cost regions, we show that the income tax needs to be adjusted for 
differences in regional living costs.11 
Regional differences in consumption amenities complicate our analy-
sis.12  Consumption amenities, which include sunny weather, good schools, 
and access to entertainment and recreation, can be reflected in either lower 
salaries or higher living costs.  Differences in amenities reflected in the cost 
of living do not misallocate resources.13  Yet, differences in consumption 
amenities reflected in salaries introduce a second misallocation.  Other 
things equal, employers and employees both prefer for employees to receive 
some of their compensation in the form of (untaxed) amenities rather than 
(taxed) salary.  Amenities that are reflected in lower salaries misallocate 
capital and labor by encouraging production in high-amenity/low-salary re-
gions and discouraging it in low-amenity/high-salary regions.14 
Surprisingly, a simple adjustment will eliminate, in theory at least, the 
inefficiencies flowing from the tax system’s failure to account for differ-
ences in both regional living costs and amenities.  That adjustment calls 
for dividing each taxpayer’s income by the region’s relative before-tax sal-
ary level.15  Such an adjustment assesses the same nominal tax on taxpay-
ers with the same standard of living across regions, thereby ensuring that 
tax considerations neither encourage nor discourage taxpayers from locat-
ing in any region.16 
I.  DIFFERENCES IN LIVING COSTS AND  
PRODUCTIVITY ACROSS REGIONS 
This Part describes, first, how living costs can differ across regions 
and, second, the relationships between living costs and salaries and be-
tween living costs and the return to capital. 
A.  Why Living Costs Differ Across Regions 
The cost of living varies substantially across the United States.17  The 
New York metropolitan area is the most expensive; Kingsport, Tennessee 
is the least expensive.18  To achieve a standard of living equivalent to an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 Part IV describes how to make the appropriate adjustment. 
 12 See infra Part VII, pp. 1007–17. 
 13 See infra section VII.A.2, pp. 1010–12. 
 14 See infra section VII.A.1, pp. 1008–10. 
 15 As discussed in Part VI, pp. 1005–07, only the taxpayer’s location-specific income (principally 
earned income) should be adjusted for regional differences in living costs.  Non-location-specific income 
(principally income from capital) should not be adjusted. 
 16 See infra Parts V, pp. 1000–05, and VII, pp. 1007–17. 
 17 See Walter W. McMahon, Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update, 19 AREUEA: J. 
AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N 426, 426 (1991). 
 18 ACCRA COST OF LIVING INDEX, Aug. 2002, at 1.7, 1.10.  The best data on United States re-
gional costs of living is compiled by ACCRA, a nonprofit organization comprising the research staffs of 
chambers of commerce and other organizations.  ACCRA compiles data quarterly from local chambers 
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annual after-tax income of $40,000 in the average U.S. city requires about 
$88,000 after tax in New York.19  To obtain the same standard of living in 
Kingsport requires only about $34,000.20  The cost of living in a region is 
usually expressed as a multiple of the national average.  Thus, the cost of 
living in New York is 2.20 and in Kingsport is 0.85.21 
The cost of living is defined as the cost to a typical consumer of main-
taining a fixed standard of living.22  It is calculated as the cost to such a 
consumer of purchasing a fixed basket of goods and services.23  The cost 
of living differs across regions because the prices of the constituent items 
differ.  These items are commonly divided into two broad classes: housing, 
and other goods and services. 
The costs of other goods and services differ principally because of sup-
ply differences.  Transportation costs, which raise the cost of most goods 
and services in less accessible areas, help explain the increased cost of liv-
ing in Alaska and Hawaii.24  A higher cost of living can also result from 
scarcity of a particular good in a region.  The costs of providing water and 
energy, for example, vary substantially from region to region.25  In addi-
tion, maintaining the same standard of living might also require more of a 
particular item in one region than in another.  For example, the costs of 
adequate heating in frigid areas and cooling in sweltering areas increase 
living costs in those areas.26 
Housing costs vary principally because of differences in demand.  
Housing responds differently to changes in demand than most goods do.  
Increased demand for most goods other than housing quickly brings an in-
crease in supply to a region with little long-run effect on price.27  The de-
mand for clothing, cars, and electronic equipment, for example, is higher 
in more densely populated areas, but prices for such items are about the 
same as in thinly populated areas.  Increased demand for housing, by con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of commerce that have volunteered to price a list of goods and services in their communities.  See id. at 
i–ii. 
 19 See id. at ii, 1.7. 
 20 See id. at ii, 1.10. 
 21 See infra Appendix I, pp. 1021–23. 
 22 See ACCRA COST OF LIVING INDEX, supra note 18, at i–ii. 
 23 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN THE 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX § 2 (June 1997), http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpigm697.htm. 
 24 See infra Appendix I, pp. 1021–23. 
 25 See id. 
 26 Although the theoretically correct cost of living would take account of differences in the con-
sumption basket across regions, cost of living indexes are calculated using the same basket in all re-
gions.  See id.; ACCRA COST OF LIVING INDEX, supra note 18, at i, iii. 
 27 Supply is said to be highly elastic.  This assumption is standard in the regional economics litera-
ture.  See, e.g., Joseph Gyourko et al., Quality of Life and Environmental Comparisons, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1413, 1416–17 (Paul Cheshire & Edwin S. 
Mills eds., 1999). 
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trast, usually has a larger effect on price because the amount of land is 
fixed.28 
The demand for housing can be high for two reasons.  First, the region 
might have strong consumption amenities.  Consumption amenities include 
both public goods — such as gorgeous scenery, good public schools, a low 
crime rate, and pollution-free air and water — and private goods — such 
as theaters, restaurants, and professional sports teams.  Demand for hous-
ing is high in areas with strong positive amenities.  For example, housing 
on the coast, especially outside of flood plains, is expensive.  Conversely, 
demand for housing is low in areas with strong negative amenities, such as 
high pollution levels, bad weather, and high crime rates. 
A second reason for high housing prices is that the region may have 
production amenities that make workers more productive in their jobs and 
therefore allow them to earn more than they would if they lived elsewhere.  
Workers might be more productive because of local resources such as 
cheap energy, good transportation, and proximity to markets.  Workers also 
might be more productive because of their proximity to other workers.29 
B.  The Relationships Between Living Costs and Salaries and Between 
Living Costs and the Return to Capital 
The United States is a highly mobile society in which individuals can 
easily change jobs and locations.  Such mobility tends to equalize living 
standards.  Accordingly, in the United States, there has been a “persistent 
and strong” convergence in regional living standards.30 
Equalizing living standards is not the same as equalizing nominal in-
comes.  Differences in nominal incomes are likely to persist as long as liv-
ing costs differ.  Ignoring, for the moment, differences in consumption 
amenities, and assuming that regional living standards have fully converged 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 The assumption that supply of land is highly inelastic is standard in the literature.  See, e.g., id. 
 29 There appear to be large positive productivity externalities for workers in many fields and even 
across fields.  These externalities make the productivity of many skilled workers higher in urban areas 
than in rural areas.  See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER & DAVID C. MARÉ, CITIES AND SKILLS 
(NBER Discussion Paper No. 1678, 1994) (arguing that workers acquire skills faster in dense environ-
ments).  If there are such externalities, subsidies to employees or employers in high-cost areas might be 
appropriate.  These subsidies, as well as any taxes that might be appropriate to offset congestion costs, 
are beyond the scope of this article. 
 30 Matthew P. Drennan et al., The Interruption of Income Convergence and Income Growth in Large 
Cities in the 1980s, 33 URB. STUD. 63, 63 (1996) (“[I]n the historical experience of the US, the con-
vergence of regional income, whatever the measure of income used, has been persistent and strong.”  
(citations omitted)).  Theorists predict that living standards will converge over time.  See, e.g., J.R. 
HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 37–39 (2d ed. 1963).  And numerous academic studies support the 
theory as applied to the United States. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Convergence 
Across States and Regions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 107, 107–08 (1991); George 
H. Borts, The Equalization of Returns and Regional Economic Growth, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 319, 343 
(1960).  A notable exception to this long-term convergence was the divergence in regional incomes dur-
ing the 1980s.  See Drennan et al., supra, at 63. 
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to an equilibrium, the relationship between real after-tax income for any 







income tax-after Nominalincome tax-after Real  for all i, (1) 
 
where K is a constant across regions for that occupation.  Thus, in equilib-
rium, there is a direct relationship between nominal after-tax income and 
relative living costs: increasing relative living costs by 50% will increase 
nominal after-tax income by 50%.32 
Financial capital is even more mobile than labor; it moves easily, not 
just throughout the United States, but throughout the world.  Moreover, fi-
nancial capital can be employed far from where its owner lives.  Today, vast 
amounts of capital can be moved quickly to take advantage of even very 
small differences in return.  This mobility quickly tends to drive down ex-
cess profits to capital in any location to ordinary levels.  Thus, capital own-
ers generally will earn only an (ex ante) ordinary return on their invest-
ments, with any differences in return accounted for by differences in risk.  
Competition thus tends to make the risk-adjusted, after-tax return to capital 
the same, regardless of where it is located, so that: 
 
k=icapital to  returntax-after adjusted-Risk  for all i, (2) 
 
where k is a constant across regions.33 
In summary, in equilibrium, nominal after-tax wages are proportionate 
to living costs, but the nominal after-tax return to capital is fixed and inde-
pendent of living costs. 
II.  THE NO-TAX BENCHMARK 
This Part provides a simple example of how resources are allocated in 
an economy without taxes.  In this and the four following Parts, we as-
sume that the value of consumption amenities is constant across regions.34  
Cost of living differences are a result either of differential prices for some 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 The region’s relative cost of living, simply called the cost of living throughout this Article, and 




Living of CostiRegionCi = . 
  
The index is normalized with a mean of one. 
 32 This is consistent with the standard assumption in the urban economics literature that the market 
through which people choose where to live is in equilibrium.  See Gyourko et al., supra note 27, at 
1417. 
 33 This is consistent with the standard assumption in the regional economics literature that capital 
owners are indifferent to where their capital is employed.  See id. 
 34 We introduce differences in amenities in Part VII, infra pp. 1007–17. 
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goods and services other than housing, or of different population densities 
producing different demands for housing.  In either case, such differences 
in living costs will be reflected in different levels of employee productivity 
at the margin. 
Consider an economy with three regions — Cheap, Middling, and 
Pricey — each with a different cost of living.  An after-tax income of 
$50,000 in Middling has the same purchasing power as $40,000 in Cheap 
or $60,000 in Pricey.  Thus, if Middling represents the national average 
cost of living, Cheap will have a cost of living that is 80% of the national 
average and Pricey a cost that is 120% of the average.35 
Consider someone in such an economy who has been offered equiva-
lent jobs in the three regions.  The jobs, all of which provide the same 
standard of living, pay $40,000 in Cheap, $50,000 in Middling, and 
$60,000 in Pricey.  This is illustrated in Table 1A below. 
As Table 1A illustrates, the jobs pay different nominal salaries, but 
each pays a real salary of $50,000.  Accordingly, an individual choosing 
where to work solely on the basis of her standard of living would be indif-
ferent among the three jobs. 
Imagine that the employer is a large, national business with employees 
in all three regions and that its ownership is widely dispersed.  The em-
ployer combines hired capital and labor to produce goods or services that 
it sells in a competitive national market.  If the employer generates the 
same revenue by hiring an additional employee in any 
 
TABLE 1A.  NO-TAX BENCHMARK: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Nominal Income $40,000 $50,000 $60,000 
Cost of Living 0.8 1 1.2 
Real Income  
(Adjusted for  
Cost of Living) 
$50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 To simplify the discussion, we assume throughout this Article that a serviceable index of relative 
living costs, Ci, has been compiled.  This is not necessarily an easy task, and constructing a perfect in-
dex is impossible.  For discussions of the theoretical impossibility of a perfect index and difficulties in 
constructing serviceable indexes, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POVERTY MEASUREMENT: 
ADJUSTING FOR GEOGRAPHIC COST-OF-LIVING DIFFERENCES 3–6 (Report No. GAO/GGD-95-64, 
1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95064.pdf; and Kaplow, supra note 7, at 188–
89.  See also infra section VIII.B.1, p. 1019. 
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region, it would benefit most by hiring the next employee in Cheap, be-
cause it can pay that additional employee the least.  Thus, for employers to 
be indifferent as to the region in which the company hires an additional 
employee, the difference in the corporation’s revenue across regions must 
equal the difference in the employee’s salary.  Hence, the firm in Table 1A 
would be indifferent as to where it hired an additional employee only if the 
employee generated $10,000 more revenue for the firm in Middling than in 
Cheap, and $10,000 more in Pricey than in Middling. 
In contrast to employees, who take into account both the salary and the 
local cost of living in deciding where to work, capital owners take into ac-
count only the return to capital (appropriately adjusted for risk) in deciding 
where to invest.  Most individuals must live close to where they work, 
whereas capital owners can invest their capital almost anywhere they 
choose and are not constrained to invest close to home.  Because capital 
owners can separate their location and investment decisions, in equilib-
rium, the risk-adjusted return to capital is equal across regions.36  If it is 
not, capital will leave regions where the return is low and move to regions 
where it is high.  Thus, the productivity of capital must be constant across 
regions and must equal its marginal return.  Accordingly, if the equilibrium 
return to capital in Middling is $22,500, it is also $22,500 in Cheap and 
Pricey.37  This is illustrated by Table 1B. 
TABLE 1B.  NO-TAX BENCHMARK: RETURN TO CAPITAL 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Return to Capital $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 
 
This example (Tables 1A and 1B) serves as a benchmark to define the 
no-tax equilibrium.  Against this benchmark, it is possible to determine 
how the income tax affects the allocation of resources across regions. 
This benchmark equilibrium also implies a capital-labor ratio in each 
region.  Two standard assumptions in economics are that the marginal 
product of labor increases as the amount of capital available to each em-
ployee rises38 and that, in equilibrium, labor and capital are paid the value 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 There are differences in political risk across countries that affect the expected return.  However, 
any differences in political risk within the United States are probably very small.  Throughout this Arti-
cle, we have assumed that the level of risk across regions is constant.  This assumption is not necessary, 
but it simplifies the exposition. 
 37 The return to capital is for one unit of capital.  For example, if a unit of capital is $300,000, then 
the rate of return on capital is 7.5%. 
 38 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 124 (15th ed. 1995). 
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of their marginal products.39  We will use these assumptions to determine 
how the equilibria with different tax systems compare to the no-tax 
benchmark equilibrium and to each other. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE INTERREGIONAL ALLOCATION OF 
RESOURCES 
To understand how taxes affect the allocation of resources throughout 
the economy, we assume that the government imposes a flat 20% income 
tax (without a zero-bracket amount) on both capital and earned income.40  
To focus on the tax side of the issue, we further assume that the tax revenue 
raised from each taxpayer is not spent purchasing goods and services in 
her community, where the real purchasing power would depend on her lo-
cal living costs.  Instead, we assume that the revenue is spent in a manner 
that is independent of where it is raised.  Conceptually, it might be sim-
plest to think of the government raising revenue to spend generating na-
tional public goods, such as foreign aid, national defense, public parks, or 
the Washington bureaucracy.  In all of these instances, the purchasing 
power of the tax revenue does not depend on where the taxpayers who 
provided the funds reside.41 
As in the no-tax benchmark, we assume that labor and capital are mo-
bile and that there are no regional differences in the value of consumption 
amenities.  The assumption that labor is mobile implies that, in equilib-
rium, real after-tax salaries will be in proportion to living costs.  The as-
sumption that capital is mobile implies that the equilibrium after-tax return 
to capital will be equal across regions.  Once again, equilibrium is estab-
lished when individuals have no incentive to move and capital owners 
have no incentive to shift their capital. 
Under these assumptions, equilibrium gross salaries are unchanged by 
the tax.  Each employee, however, must pay 20% of her salary in taxes, 
which leaves her with 20% less to spend on consumption.  The before- and 
after-tax incomes of employees in each region are shown in Table 2A. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 316–20 
(6th ed. 1998).  This assumption holds as long as there is no monopoly power in the factor markets.  
HIRSHLEIFER & HIRSHLEIFER, supra, at 320. 
 40 We also assume that there is no separate entity-level income tax like the corporate income tax, but 
that all entity-level income is passed through to individual owners for the purpose of calculating taxable 
income. 
 41 We relax this assumption later.  Appendix III, pp. 1023–25, describes how to construct the effi-
ciency-producing multiplier when taxes are used to provide taxpayers with local goods and services.  
We also assume that the economic incidence of the tax is identical to the payment obligations imposed 
by the tax.  Again, this assumption does not affect the results, but it does simplify the exposition. 
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TABLE 2A.  20% TAX: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Before-Tax Income $40,000 $50,000 $60,000 
Tax (20%) $8000 $10,000 $12,000 
Nominal After-Tax 
Income 
$32,000 $40,000 $48,000 
Cost of Living 0.8 1 1.2 
Real After-Tax In-
come 
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
 
The gross return to capital is also unchanged — it remains $22,500 in 
each region.  The net return to capital, therefore, is reduced by $4500, the 
tax paid, to $18,000.  This is illustrated by Table 2B below. 
Tables 2A and 2B describe an equilibrium — a situation in which there 
is no incentive for resources to move.  Employees have no incentive to 
move because their real after-tax income is $40,000 in each region.  Capi-
tal owners have no incentive to shift their capital because they receive 
$18,000 after tax in each region. 
Most importantly, the income tax has not shifted resources: the alloca-
tion of resources is the same both before and after imposition of the tax.  
Resources do not shift because imposition of the tax changes 
 
TABLE 2B.  20% TAX: RETURN TO CAPITAL 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Taxable Income $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 
Tax (20%) $4500 $4500 $4500 
After-Tax Return to 
Capital 
$18,000 $18,000 $18,000 
 
neither pre-tax salaries nor the pre-tax return to capital in any region.42 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 The productivity of labor depends on the amount of both labor and capital; likewise, the produc-
tivity of capital depends on the amount of both capital and labor.  In equilibrium, the wage or return to 
each factor equals the value of its marginal product, which depends on the amount of both labor and 
capital.  Thus, since gross wages and gross returns are unchanged by the income tax (compare Table 
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IV.  HOW THE INCOME TAX MISALLOCATES RESOURCES 
In Part II, we showed that in the absence of an income tax the alloca-
tion of resources across regions is efficient.43  In Part III, we showed that 
the allocation with a flat income tax is identical to that without an income 
tax.  It might, therefore, be thought that the allocation with a flat income 
tax is also efficient.  The argument is simple enough: the interregional al-
location in a no-tax world is efficient; imposing a flat income tax does not 
change that allocation; therefore, the allocation of resources across regions 
with a flat income tax is efficient. 
Surprisingly, however, that conclusion is incorrect.  Although a flat tax 
does not change the allocation of resources, it causes that allocation to be-
come inefficient.  This Part demonstrates this claim and explains the intui-
tion behind it. 
An allocation of resources is efficient if it is not possible to reallocate 
resources and improve the welfare of at least one party without making at 
least one other party worse off.44  Thus, an allocation is inefficient if it is 
possible, by reallocating resources, to improve the welfare of some or all 
individuals without reducing anyone’s welfare.45 
Table 2A makes it easy to see that the interregional allocation of re-
sources with an income tax is inefficient.  Removing one employee from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1A, row 1, supra p. 994, with Table 2A, row 1, supra p. 996, and Table 1B, row 1, supra p. 995, with 
Table 2B, row 1, supra p. 997), the value of the marginal product of each factor is also unchanged. 
  This implies that resources are not reallocated across regions: the tax reduces the after-tax salary 
in each region by 20%.  As a result, the after-tax income in Pricey is still 20% larger than that in Mid-
dling, whereas the after-tax income in Cheap is still 20% smaller than that in Middling.  Thus, after 
adjusting for the regional cost of living differences of 20%, employees in each region will have the 
same standard of living. 
 43 Our analysis in Part II, supra pp. 993–95, assumed that there were no regional differences in the 
value of consumption amenities.  In section VII.A.2, infra pp. 1010–12, we show that the tax-free allo-
cation of resources is still efficient when the value of amenities is allowed to differ across regions. 
 44 This is the standard definition of Pareto efficiency.  See, e.g., JOHN HICKS, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, in WEALTH AND WELFARE 59, 64 (1981); Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, 
in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 889, 890 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).  
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency occurs when it is impossible to reallocate resources such that the winners 
would still come out ahead if the losers were compensated for their losses.  HICKS, supra, at 75–76; 
NICHOLAS KALDOR, Welfare Propositions in Economics, in ESSAYS ON VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION 
143–45 (2d ed. 1980); Feldman, supra, at 892.  In the simple example we use, the two definitions differ 
only to the extent that there are transitional gains and losses, which we briefly discuss in section VIII.A, 
infra p. 1018. 
 45 Efficiency is especially desirable in situations, such as this one, in which in the long run no one 
benefits from an inefficient allocation of resources.  The movement of persons and capital eliminates 
differences in real after-tax income and the return to capital.  As a result, the costs of an inefficient allo-
cation of resources are likely to be widely disbursed, as are the potential benefits from an efficient allo-
cation.  Boris Bittker provides an amusing and insightful discussion of the tendency of markets to capi-
talize tax benefits into prices, thereby eliminating the profit from purchasing tax-advantaged assets.  See 
BORIS BITTKER, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, in 
COLLECTED LEGAL ESSAYS 547 (1989) (describing how the value of the mortgage interest deduction 
has been capitalized into home prices). 
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Cheap reduces gross revenue by $40,000.  That reduction is split between 
a decline in the after-tax payments to labor ($32,000) and a loss in tax 
revenue ($8000).  Adding one employee to Pricey increases gross revenue 
by $60,000.  Out of this amount, it is possible to compensate the employee 
($48,00046) and the Treasury ($800047) and still have $4000 remaining.  
Because it is possible to shift one employee from Cheap to Pricey, com-
pensate all parties for their losses, and still have $4000 to distribute, the 
original allocation of resources is not efficient.  Thus, the imposition of a 
flat income tax, even though it does not reallocate resources, causes that 
allocation to become inefficient. 
The inefficiency caused by the income tax has several properties.  First, 
it has a direction.  Our model employs two factors of production — labor 
and capital — that are in fixed supply.48  Employees decide where to live 
and work, and capital owners decide where to invest their capital.  Equilib-
rium occurs when the real after-tax wage and the nominal after-tax return 
to capital are constant across regions.  The resulting equilibrium is charac-
terized by the labor-capital ratio in each region.  Relative to the efficient 
allocation of resources, labor is used too intensively relative to capital in 
Cheap and labor is not used intensively enough relative to capital in 
Pricey.  This conclusion follows from the demonstration that shifting one 
employee from Cheap to Pricey (thereby lowering the labor-capital ratio in 
Cheap and raising it in Pricey) is efficiency-enhancing. 
Second, the efficiency loss can be quantified.  At the margin, that loss 
is $4000 — exactly the gain that could be produced by shifting one em-
ployee from Cheap to Pricey.  As more employees relocate, the potential 
gain from shifting one more employee declines as wages fall in Pricey and 
rise in Cheap.  The total inefficiency loss is the sum of the foregone 
gains.49 
Third, one can identify the source of the inefficiency.  An employee lo-
cated in Cheap pays $8000 in tax, an employee in Middling pays $10,000, 
and an employee in Pricey pays $12,000.50  The difference in tax thus 
raises the cost to employers of hiring employees in Pricey and reduces that 
cost in Cheap.  It is this tax-induced increased cost of hiring in Pricey and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 The cost of living in Pricey is 150% of that in Cheap.  Thus, it takes an after-tax salary of 
$48,000 in Pricey to provide the same standard of living as an after-tax salary of $32,000 in Cheap. 
 47 It takes $8000 to compensate the tax collector (not $12,000) because tax revenue is not spent at 
the local cost of living. 
 48 One effect of imposing an income tax is to reduce the returns to labor and capital in the economy.  
These reductions are likely to cause resources to leave the economy by going offshore or withdrawing 
from the market.  Because this well-known effect is separate from the effect that we are examining — 
the misallocation across regions brought about by the income tax — we assume that the income tax 
does not cause resources to be withdrawn from the market.  This isolates the impact of the income tax 
on the allocation of resources across regions. 
 49 In theory, the total efficiency loss can be measured if the responsiveness of wages to labor in 
each region can be estimated. 
 50 See supra Table 2A, row 2, supra p. 996. 
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decreased cost in Cheap that is the source of the inefficiency.51  As com-
pared to employees in Middling, the tax system imposes an additional tax 
of $2000 on employees in Pricey and grants a $2000 subsidy to employees 
in Cheap.  The additional tax imposed on employees located in high-cost 
regions is inefficient because it will prevent employers from hiring employ-
ees who are sufficiently more productive to cover their additional living ex-
penses, but are not sufficiently more productive to cover their additional 
taxes as well.  The effect is the opposite for low-cost regions: the tax reduc-
tion granted to employees located in low-cost regions is inefficient because 
it will induce employers to hire employees who are not sufficiently produc-
tive to cover their incremental living expenses without the tax subsidy.  
Thus, when living costs vary regionally, a flat tax discourages employees 
from lo- 
cating in high-cost regions and encourages them to locate in low-cost re-
gions.52 
In effect, the tax creates a wedge between social and private benefits 
across regions.  The movement of individuals will ensure that private 
benefits (the real after-tax standard of living) are equal across regions (in 
the example, $40,000 in each region53).  Interregional efficiency requires 
that total social benefits are equal when private benefits are equal.  In the 
model, tax revenues are the only social benefits that are not also private 
benefits.  It is, accordingly, because tax revenues are greater in high-cost 
regions ($12,000 in Pricey) than in low-cost regions ($8000 in Cheap) that 
the flat tax is inefficient.  (That is to say, the total social benefit is $52,000 
if an additional person locates in Pricey, but only $48,000 if she locates in 
Cheap.54) 
The reason imposing a flat tax causes the allocation of resources to be-
come inefficient without changing that allocation is subtle.  Without an in-
come tax, the employee’s entire gross salary is spent at her cost of living; 
however, with an income tax, only the after-tax portion of that salary is 
spent at her cost of living.  The portion of her salary that is paid in taxes is 
spent outside of the region and in a manner that is independent of her cost 
of living.  Thus, in the example, an employee in Pricey with $48,000 can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Our analysis assumes that living costs are not tax-deductible.  However, taxpayers who itemize 
their deductions can deduct some living costs, such as home mortgage interest, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) 
(2000), housing expenses incurred while living abroad in excess of an amount determined by a formula, 
id. § 911(c)(3), and state and local taxes, id. § 164.  These deductions are efficiency-enhancing to the 
extent that they are larger where living costs are higher.  At best, however, they are a second-best solu-
tion.  By encouraging taxpayers to spend more on deductible living costs and less on nondeductible 
living costs, they also reduce efficiency. 
 52 A progressive income tax schedule, in which the marginal tax rate increases with income, exacer-
bates this effect because the higher tax rate further increases the tax on higher income employees, who 
are likely to live in high-cost regions. 
 53 See supra Table 2A, row 5, supra p. 996. 
 54 See supra Table 2A, rows 2 and 5, supra p. 996. 
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purchase the same goods and services as an employee in Middling with 
$40,000, or as an employee in Cheap with $32,000.  In contrast, the gov-
ernment purchases more goods and services with the $12,000 raised in 
Pricey than with the $10,000 raised in Middling, and it purchases more 
with the $10,000 raised in Middling than with the $8000 raised in Cheap.55  
This difference — that the purchasing power of a dollar of after-tax in-
come is in proportion to the cost of living in the region where it was 
earned, while the purchasing power of a dollar of tax revenue is independ-
ent of the cost of living in the region where it was raised — is the source 
of the wedge between social and private benefits that creates the interre-
gional inefficiency. 
V.  ADJUSTING TAXES TO REFLECT DIFFERENCES IN REGIONAL LIVING 
COSTS 
Part IV demonstrated that an income tax misallocates resources across 
regions with different living costs because employees in high-cost regions 
earn more and thus pay higher nominal taxes than employees in low-cost 
regions.  The additional taxes that are paid when an employer hires an ad-
ditional employee in a high-cost region discourages employers from hiring 
in high-cost regions and encourages them to hire in low-cost regions.  It 
follows, therefore, that to achieve an efficient allocation of resources, em-
ployees with the same real after-tax income should pay the same nominal 
tax regardless of where they locate.56  This Part describes how to modify 
the income tax to produce the efficient allocation of resources across re-
gions. 
So that resources are allocated efficiently across regions, individuals 
should be taxed on adjusted taxable income, which is defined as follows: 
 
im IncomeTaxable IncomeTaxable Adjusted ×= , (3) 
 
where mi is the multiplier for region i.  In the simple examples used in this 
Article, we assume a flat tax without a zero-bracket amount.57  Under such 
a flat tax, increasing taxable income by the multiplier is equivalent to in-
creasing the tax rate by the same multiplier: 
 
 imRate Tax StatutoryRate Tax Effective ×= . (4) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 Since employees have the same real income in all three regions, total output (measured as the 
sum of personal real after-tax income plus government purchases of real goods and services) is highest 
in Pricey and lowest in Cheap. 
 56 A head tax, for instance, would eliminate the interregional inefficiency; however, it would impose 
the same tax on people with different standards of living.  The adjustment proposed in this Article 
would impose the same tax on individuals with the same standard of living, while permitting the tax 
system to impose different tax liabilities on people with different standards of living. 
 57 Tax progressivity is considered infra note 115. 
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As shown in Part IV, the misallocation of resources will be prevented if 
all employees with the same real after-tax income pay the same amount in 
tax regardless of where they live.  In this case, taxes will neither subsidize 
nor penalize the decision to hire people in low- or high-cost regions. 
This Part describes two methods for calculating the efficiency-producing 
multiplier: one uses the relative salary level and the other uses the relative 
cost of living.  In equilibrium, where living standards are equal across re-
gions,58 the two methods produce the same result. 
A.  Relative Salary Method 
The relative-salary multiplier is designed to ensure that employees with 
the same real after-tax income pay the same amount in tax regardless of 
where they locate.  This can be achieved by dividing each employee’s in-
come by the ratio of her salary to the equivalent salary in a region with the 
national average cost of living.  Denoting this relative salary ratio by Si, 




=Sim . (5) 
 
In effect, equation 5 exempts from tax the additional salary that com-
pensates for the higher cost of living in high-cost regions and taxes the in-
creased purchasing power that compensates for the lower nominal salary 
earned in low-cost regions.  Equation 5 imposes this incremental tax with-
out directly measuring the incremental cost of living.  Instead, equation 5 
measures that incremental cost indirectly through the incremental salary 
that compensates employees for regional cost-of-living differences. 
B.  Relative Cost-of-Living Method 
A second way to calculate the multiplier uses the relative cost of living.  
Denoting the statutory tax rate by τ, the relative cost-of-living multiplier, 
C









m , (6) 
 
where Ci is an index of the region’s relative cost of living.60 
The multiplier given in equation 6, Cim , is not the reciprocal of the 
cost of living (1/Ci).61  Rather, it is a weighted average of the cost of living 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 That is to say, where equation 1, supra p. 992, holds. 
 59 The multipliers are derived in Appendix II, infra p. 1023. 
 60 See supra note 31. 
 61 The cost of living is calculated after the payment of federal income taxes.  Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Understanding the Consumer Price Index: Answers to Some Questions, at http://stats. 
bls.gov/cpi/cpi1998g.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2003) (“[T]he CPI excludes taxes (such as income and 
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(Ci) and one, where the weights are the after-tax portion of income, 1 – τ ,  
and the portion paid in taxes, τ .   A weighted average is used because equi-
librium does not require that gross salaries be in proportion to living costs.  
Instead, equilibrium requires that the after-tax portion of salaries be in 
proportion to living costs.62  The multiplier in equation 6 thus ensures that 
taxes are equal across regions when the after-tax portion of salary is in 
proportion to living costs.63  Thus, equations 5 and 6 each eliminate the 
wedge between social and private benefits that produces the inefficiency 
by ensuring that taxes are equal when real after-tax income is equal. 
Table 3 gives the equilibrium before-tax incomes of employees in dif-
ferent regions with an income tax that adjusts for differences in regional 
living costs using equation 5 or 6 (which, in equilibrium, are the same). 
TABLE 3.  ADJUSTED TAX: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Before-Tax Income $42,000 $50,000 $58,000 
Multiplier 1.1905 1 0.8621 
Effective Tax Rate 23.81% 20% 17.24% 
Tax $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Nominal After-Tax In-
come 
$32,000 $40,000 $48,000 
Cost of Living 0.8 1 1.2 
Real After-Tax In- $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Social Security taxes) not directly associated with the purchase of consumer goods and services.”).  If 
cost-of-living figures were calculated on a before-tax instead of an after-tax basis, the reciprocal of the 
cost of living would be the proper multiplier. 
 62 The most obvious solution to the failure to adjust taxes for differences in regional living costs — 
assessing taxes on real income by dividing nominal income by the relative cost of living — would not 
just eliminate the bias in favor of areas with low living costs and against areas with high living costs.  If 
adopted, such a multiplier would also encourage employees to locate in high-cost areas and discourage 
them from locating in low-cost areas. 
  This can be made clear with an extreme example.  Assume that the statutory tax rate is 50% and 
consider a region with a cost of living that is 50% of the national average.  If the multiplier were the 
reciprocal of the cost of living, the effective tax rate would be 100%.  Thus, taxpayers living in such a 
region would be required to pay their entire income in federal taxes.  Moreover, taxpayers living in re-
gions with even lower living costs would be subject to effective tax rates in excess of 100% and so 
would be obligated to pay more than their entire income in taxes. 
 63 We could find only one provision in the tax code that attempts to equate nominal tax with real 
income.  Section 912 exempts from taxation payments received by civilian employees of the U.S. gov-
ernment who are stationed outside of the United States when such payments are received as compensa-
tion for higher costs of living.  I.R.C. § 912(2) (2000). 
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Because the proposed modification would not adjust capital owners’ 
taxes for differences in living costs, the return to capital is still given by 
Table 2B.64 
It is easy to establish that the above allocation of resources is efficient.  
Shifting one employee from Cheap to Pricey will produce just enough 
revenue to compensate the employee and the Treasury.  If one employee 
were shifted, gross revenue in Cheap would fall by $42,000, which is di-
vided between labor ($32,000) and the Treasury ($10,000).  The shift 
would increase gross revenue in Pricey by $58,000.  Out of this amount, it 
is possible to compensate labor ($48,000) and the Treasury ($10,000) with 
nothing left over.  As the example illustrates, the allocation of labor is effi-
cient because the tax on salaries is the same amount ($10,000) in all three 
regions. 
We can compare the efficient allocation of resources resulting from our 
revised income tax to the inefficient allocation that occurs with a flat tax.  
An income tax that efficiently adjusts for regional differences employs la-
bor more intensively in high-cost regions and less intensively in low-cost 
regions.  In equilibrium, salaries are $2000 higher in Cheap ($42,000 as 
opposed to $40,000) and $2000 lower in Pricey ($58,000 as opposed to 
$60,000) with our suggested adjustment than with no adjustment.65  Be-
cause such a salary shift can only be brought about by decreasing labor in-
tensity in Cheap and increasing it in Pricey, it follows that labor is being 
used more intensively in Pricey and less intensively in Cheap with an effi-
cient income tax than with a flat income tax.66 
C.  Progressivity 
A progressive income tax may exacerbate inefficiencies due to regional 
cost-of-living differences.  As noted earlier, even a flat tax produces an in-
efficient allocation of resources across regions by discouraging employers 
from hiring workers in high-cost regions and encouraging them to hire in 
low-cost regions, because the nominal tax liability is greater for employees 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 See supra p. 997. 
 65 Compare Table 3, row 1, supra p. 1003, with Table 2A, row 1, supra p. 996. 
 66 Moreover, the efficient allocation of resources in the presence of an income tax is not the same 
allocation that would be efficient in a no-tax world.  As discussed in Part IV, supra pp. 997–1000, the 
allocation with a flat tax is identical to the allocation that occurs in a no-tax world, but efficiency re-
quires that labor be used more intensively in Pricey and less intensively in Cheap than it would be in the 
no-tax world.  Equilibrium gross salaries with an efficient income tax are $2000 lower in Pricey 
($58,000 as opposed to $60,000) and $2000 higher in Cheap ($42,000 as opposed to $40,000) than in 
the no-tax world.  Compare Table 3, row 1, supra p. 1003, with Table 1A, row 1, supra p. 994.  Thus, 
compared to the no-tax world, an efficient income tax uses labor more intensively in high-cost regions 
and less intensively in low-cost regions. 
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located in high-cost regions than for employees located in low-cost re-
gions.67  This effect is exacerbated by a progressive income tax if the 
higher nominal income earned by taxpayers located in high-cost regions 
forces them into higher brackets, increasing their tax liabilities still further. 
This can be illustrated by assuming that instead of a flat 20% tax, the 
tax rate is 15% on the first $40,000 of income and 40% thereafter.68  The 
resulting equilibrium salary levels in Cheap, Middling, and Pricey are 
given by Table 4. 
TABLE 4.  PROGRESSIVE TAX: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME 
 Cheap Middling Pricey 
Before-Tax Income $37,647 $50,000 $63,333 
Tax $5647 $10,000 $15,333 
Nominal After-Tax  
Income 
$32,000 $40,000 $48,000 
Cost of Living 0.8 1 1.2 
Real After-Tax Income $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
 
The progressive tax schedule exacerbates the misallocation of resources 
across regions by further increasing the capital-labor ratio in Pricey and 
further reducing it in Cheap.69  Because the cost of the inefficiency can be 
measured by the difference in nominal taxes paid by a worker in Pricey and 
Cheap, that cost increases from $4000 [= $12,000 – $8000]70 to almost 
$10,000 [= $15,333 – $5647] when the flat tax is replaced with a progres-
sive tax. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 An efficient income tax increases the intensity with which labor is used in high-cost regions and 
decreases that intensity in low-cost regions (in comparison to the no-tax world) because the salary 
earned by each employee is not spent entirely at her regional cost of living.  With an income tax, that 
portion paid in taxes is spent outside of the region and in a manner independent of the region’s cost of 
living.  Accordingly, since only a portion of the employee’s salary (equal to one minus the tax rate) 
must compensate for cost of living differences, gross salaries are lower in high-cost regions and higher 
in low-cost regions with an efficient income tax than without an income tax.  This, in turn, implies that 
labor is used more intensively in high-cost regions and less intensively in low-cost regions. 
 68 Such a tax is progressive for income levels above $40,000 because the average tax rate increases 
with income.  Thus, taxpayers earning $50,000 would still pay $10,000 in tax (20% of their income), 
but taxpayers earning $40,000 would pay only $6000 (15% of their income) and taxpayers earning 
$60,000 would pay $14,000 (23% of their income). 
 69 That the capital-labor ratio is increased in Cheap and is reduced in Pricey follows because before-
tax income is lower in Cheap and higher in Pricey (relative to Table 2A, supra p. 996). 
 70 See supra Table 2A, row 2, p. 996. 
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VI.  EARNED INCOME AND CAPITAL 
This Article has so far argued that the failure to adjust personal income 
tax liabilities for differences in living costs misallocates resources and has 
described how to adjust individual income tax liabilities to eliminate that 
misallocation.  This Part considers whether all income should be so ad-
justed.  It concludes that an adjustment is appropriate only when the in-
come reflects the recipient’s local cost of living (location-specific income).  
Roughly speaking, earned income should be adjusted for differences in liv-
ing costs, but investment income should not be. 
For most people, it is not feasible to live far from their place of em-
ployment.  Accordingly, employers located in high-cost regions must pay 
high salaries because their employees incur high living expenses.  The cur-
rent tax system, which does not make any adjustments for differences in 
living costs, imposes a higher tax liability on salaries earned in high-cost 
areas.  We have shown in Part IV that the higher tax can produce ineffi-
ciency in the interregional allocation of resources. 
Not all income, however, is location-specific.  Consider, for example, a 
cartoonist with a national audience.  The cartoonist will receive the same 
income regardless of where he lives.  There is thus no need to adjust the 
cartoonist’s tax liability to reflect his local cost of living.  Indeed, doing so 
would create inefficiencies by rewarding him (with lower taxes) for living 
in a high-cost area and by penalizing him (with higher taxes) for living in 
a low-cost area. 
Not only cartoonists, but also many others — athletes, artists, actors, 
writers, inventors, import/exporters, entrepreneurs, airline pilots, newsletter 
publishers, consultants, etc. — earn income that is not location-specific.  
Their incomes are not affected by where they reside, so federal income tax 
considerations do not affect their decisions where to locate.  Thus, effi-
ciency requires that their incomes not be adjusted for regional differences 
in the cost of living.71  Of course, in some cases it can be difficult to de-
termine the extent to which a taxpayer’s income reflects the local cost of 
living.  It can be unclear, for example, whether the publisher of a financial 
newsletter specializing in the analysis of stocks must live in metropolitan 
New York.  The growth of telecommuting, moreover, is increasing the 
number of people who earn non-location-specific income.  Nevertheless, as 
a rough approximation, it is probably reasonable to treat most earned in-
come as linked to the taxpayer’s place of residence. 
In contrast, income from capital is not generally location-specific.  
Capital owners do not have to live where their capital is employed.  For 
example, anyone within the country and many outside it can invest in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 71 There is no wedge between private and social benefits across regions because the earnings of 
recipients of non-location-specific income and the tax thereon are not affected by an individual’s deci-
sion where to live. 
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U.S. stock market, buy publicly traded bonds issued in the United States, 
or deposit money in U.S. financial institutions.  The earnings on such in-
vestments do not depend on where the investor lives, and thus a tax on the 
return does not need to be adjusted for regional cost-of-living differ-
ences.72  Indeed, if it were adjusted, it would provide a tax subsidy for in-
vestors who live in high-cost regions.  It would also encourage investment 
by those living in high-cost regions and discourage investment by persons 
living in low-cost regions.73  Therefore, the existing tax system’s practice 
of ignoring cost-of-living differences is the efficient method of taxing in-
come from capital.74 
VII.  CONSUMPTION AMENITIES 
So far, we have assumed that the value of each region’s consumption 
amenities is the same.  We have assumed that individuals place equal value 
on proximity to California surf, Arizona sun, New Orleans jazz, Rocky 
Mountain skiing, Chicago theater, Southern hospitality, New England foli-
age, New York museums, and small-town America’s low crime rate.  This 
Part considers how the analysis changes when it takes into account the dif-
fering values of consumption amenities across regions.75 
When differences in amenities are excluded from the analysis, salary 
differences will reflect differences in living costs in the manner stated by 
equation 1.76  That equation states that, in equilibrium, real after-tax in-
come is constant across regions.  Thus, differences in salaries offset differ-
ences in living costs.  When allowance is made for differences in the level 
of amenities, the relationship between salaries and the cost of living is no 
longer as simple.  Rather, equilibrium among individuals requires that the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 This can be seen from Table 2B, row 2, supra p. 997. Both the tax paid and the after-tax return 
are equal across the three regions. Thus, shifting one unit of capital across regions will produce just 
enough revenue to compensate the capital owners and the Treasury. 
 73 Some of the income from capital might be viewed as location-specific.  Many capital owners in-
vest locally and play an active role in the business.  Nonetheless, the tax on the income from capital 
should not be adjusted for regional differences in living costs.  Capital can always be invested in a na-
tional (or even international) market.  Thus, at most, only the excess return a taxpayer earns over what 
she would earn by investing in the national market should be adjusted for differences in regional living 
costs.  This portion of the return is arguably a return to location-specific labor, not capital, and market 
forces would tend to eliminate such regional differences.  Therefore, because market pressures tend to 
eliminate such inframarginal returns, as a first approximation, all income from capital should be taxed at 
the national rate.  This logic also would apply to income subject to a corporate-level income tax.  Be-
cause the ultimate recipients, the shareholders, do not necessarily live near the corporation’s offices and 
plants, and because they could invest in other corporations and get a similar return, corporate income 
should be taxed at the national rate. 
 74 There is no wedge between private and social benefits across regions because the return on in-
vestment and the tax thereon are both independent of where the taxpayer chooses to invest. 
 75 Regions also might differ in production amenities. For the rest of this Part, however, the term 
“amenities” refers only to consumption amenities. 
 76 See supra p. 992. 
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sum of real after-tax income and the value of a region’s amenities (ex-
pressed here as the difference from the national average) be constant 







i =+  for all regions i, (7) 
 
where K' is an occupation-specific constant. 
With consumption amenities, there is no longer a simple relationship 
between a worker’s after-tax income and the regional cost of living.  For 
example, a region that pays relatively low salaries might do so either be-
cause living costs are low or because local amenities are attractive.  Simi-
larly, a region that pays high salaries might do so either because living 
costs are high or because local amenities are unattractive.  Expressed 
slightly differently, a high level of amenities might be reflected in low 
salaries, a high cost of living, or some combination of both.77 
A.  The Tax Treatment of Amenities and the Allocation of Resources 
Consider three regions — Gloomy, Normal, and Sunny — with differ-
ent amenity levels.  Gloomy has less than the national average level of 
amenities, Normal has the average, and Sunny has more than the average.  
Assume that for taxpayers with real incomes of $50,000, the amenities in 
Gloomy are worth $2000 less than the national average and those in Sunny 
are worth $2000 more.78 
This Part will consider two polar cases.  In the first, differences in 
amenities will be reflected entirely in salaries; in the second, differences in 
amenities will be reflected entirely in living costs.79 
1.  Amenities Fully Reflected in Salaries. — Initially, assume that all 
three regions have the national average cost of living.  In the absence of an 
income tax, salaries in Gloomy will be $2000 above those in Normal, 
which, in turn, will be $2000 above those in Sunny.  Equilibrium salaries 
and amenity levels are given in Table 5A below. 
Again, we assume that the return to capital is $22,500 in each region, 
as illustrated in Table 5B below.80 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 77 See Jennifer Roback, Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1257, 1262 (1982). 
 78 In general, the dollar value of amenities will increase as a taxpayer’s income rises.  This is true 
even for amenities that may provide the same increase in welfare for all individuals.  A beautiful view, 
for example, may provide equal enjoyment to individuals of all incomes.  A low-income individual 
would probably be willing to pay little for that view because she has other pressing needs, such as food 
and shelter.  A high-income individual, however, can afford to spend a substantial sum on a good view 
and still have ample funds remaining to satisfy her other needs. 
 79 The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that amenities are capitalized into both living 
costs and salaries. See, e.g., Gyourko et al., supra note 27, at 1420. 
 80 As explained above, supra p. 994, the equilibrium return to capital is the same across regions and 
is unaffected by salaries, costs of living, or regional amenities.   
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TABLE 5A.  NO TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN SALARY: EMPLOYEE’S 
INCOME AND AMENITIES 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Income $52,000 $50,000 $48,000 
Amenities ($2000) $0 $2000 
Income plus  
Amenities 
$50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
TABLE 5B.  NO TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN SALARY: RETURN TO 
CAPITAL 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Return to Capital $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 
 
The equilibrium salaries and amenity levels for employees in the pres-
ence of a flat 20% income tax are given in Table 6A. 
TABLE 6A.  20% UNADJUSTED TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN 
SALARY: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME AND AMENITIES 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Before-Tax Income $52,500 $50,000 $47,500 
Tax (20%) $10,500 $10,000 $9500 
After-Tax Income $42,000 $40,000 $38,000 
Amenities ($2000) $0 $2000 
After-Tax Income plus 
Amenities 
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
 
The corresponding return to capital is shown in Table 6B.  Because 
only location-specific income reflects amenity and living-cost differences, 
the income from capital is the same across regions and is not adjusted.  
Accordingly, Table 6B describes the return to capital in the presence of a 
flat 20% income tax, regardless of how the tax is adjusted for regional dif-
ferences. 
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TABLE 6B.  20% UNADJUSTED TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN 
SALARY: RETURN TO CAPITAL 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Taxable Income $22,500 $22,500 $22,500 
Tax (20%) $4500 $4500 $4500 
Return to Capital $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 
 
It is easy to see that the equilibrium described by Tables 6A and 6B is 
inefficient.  By shifting one employee from Sunny to Gloomy, it is possi-
ble to compensate the employee and the Treasury and still have $1000 left 
over.81  This misallocation occurs because the additional $5000 of salary in 
Gloomy is taxed ($1000), whereas the greater value of amenities in Sunny 
($4000) is not.  In effect, when salaries reflect amenity differences, a flat tax 
encourages taxpayers to locate in high-amenity/low-salary regions and dis-
courages them from locating in low-amenity/high-salary regions, thus mis-
allocating resources.82  This misallocation is independent of the misalloca-
tion that occurs when taxpayers are encouraged to locate in low-cost 
regions and discouraged from locating in high-cost regions. 
2.  Amenities Fully Reflected in Cost of Living. — In the previous sub-
section, any differences in amenities were assumed to be reflected in sala-
ries.  This subsection makes the opposite assumption: any differences in 
amenities are reflected in living costs.  In the absence of an income tax, 
salaries are equal across regions, but living costs are lower in Gloomy and 
higher in Sunny to reflect the difference in amenities.83  Table 7 illustrates 
this scenario.84 
TABLE 7.  NO TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN LIVING COSTS: 
EMPLOYEE’S INCOME AND AMENITIES 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 81 Removing one employee from Sunny will cost the employee $38,000 in after-tax earnings and 
$4000 in lost amenities.  It will also cost the Treasury $9500.  Adding one employee to Gloomy will 
provide the employee with $42,000 in after-tax earnings.  The additional $4000 in salary exactly com-
pensates the employee for the lost amenities.  After the Treasury receives $9500 to compensate for its 
lost revenue, there remains $1000 to distribute. 
 82 Another way of thinking about this tax is that it drives a wedge between social and private bene-
fits across regions.  The sum of after-tax income and amenities is equal across regions, but taxes are 
not.  See supra Table 6A, rows 2 and 5, supra p. 1009. 
 83 Rounded to two decimal places, the relative cost of living in Gloomy is 0.96, and the relative 
cost of living in Sunny is 1.04. 
 84 The corresponding return to capital is shown in Table 5B, supra p. 1009. 
KNOLL & GRIFFITH - BOOKPROOFS-1.DOC 11/18/03 – 2:45 PM 
1010 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:987  
Nominal Income $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
Cost of Living 0.96 1 1.04 
Real Income $52,000 $50,000 $48,000 
Amenities ($2000) $0 $2000 
Real Income plus 
Amenities 
$50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
 
After an income tax is imposed, salaries remain equal across regions.  
However, the cost of living falls in Gloomy and rises in Sunny.85  Table 8 
illustrates the before- and after-tax incomes of employees and the changed 
costs of living.86 
TABLE 8.  20% UNADJUSTED TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN LIVING 
COSTS: EMPLOYEE’S INCOME AND AMENITIES 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Before-Tax Income $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
Tax (20%) $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
Nominal After-Tax  
Income 
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
Cost of Living 0.95 1 1.05 
Real After-Tax  
Income 
$42,000 $40,000 $38,000 
Amenities ($2000) $0 $2000 
Real After-Tax 
Income plus Amenities 
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
 
When the differences in living costs fully reflect the differential value 
of amenities, the allocation of resources remains efficient after the intro-
duction of a flat tax.87  As Table 8 shows, it is not possible to increase 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 More precisely, the relative cost of living in Gloomy falls 0.01, from 0.96 to 0.95; the relative cost 
of living in Sunny rises 0.01, from 1.04 to 1.05. 
 86 The corresponding return to capital, which remains the same as it was in our first scenario, is 
illustrated in Table 6B, supra p. 1010. 
 87 In other words, the tax does not drive a wedge between private and social benefits.  When the 
nominal tax is equal across regions, so is the sum of real after-tax income and amenities.  This is true 
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anyone’s welfare by shifting resources without reducing either someone 
else’s welfare or the government’s tax revenues.88  The allocation remains 
efficient because, unlike in our prior scenario, employees pay the same tax 
($10,000) across regions.  In effect, individuals pay for increased amenities 
through higher living costs. 
The above analysis suggests that the existing income tax’s treatment of 
consumption amenities is sometimes efficient and sometimes inefficient.  
To the extent that the difference in amenities is reflected in living costs, 
the equilibrium allocation of resources is efficient; however, to the extent 
that the difference is reflected in salaries, that allocation is not efficient.89  
The logic is simple.  If the difference is reflected in living costs, salaries 
and thus taxes will be the same across regions, so there is no tax-induced 
incentive to prefer one region over another.  Conversely, if the difference is 
reflected in salaries, salaries and thus taxes will be higher in low-amenity 
regions than in high-amenity regions.  The difference in after-tax income 
across regions will not offset the difference in levels of amenities, creating a 
tax-induced bias in favor of regions with high amenities.90  This under-
standing requires us to modify our previous conclusions regarding differ-
ences in cost of living.  Because differences in the cost of living that re-
flect differences in amenities do not yield an inefficient allocation of 
resources, not all cost-of-living differences warrant a tax adjustment. 
B.  Adjusting Taxes for Differences in Amenities 
Earlier, we described two multipliers91 — one using relative salaries 
(equation 5) and the other using relative living costs (equation 6) — that 
eliminate tax-induced inefficiency when living costs vary across regions 
but the value of amenities does not.  Both multipliers equalized nominal 
tax liabilities across regions, thereby ensuring that taxes did not affect the 
decisions where to live and invest.  In this section, we assess whether 
those multipliers will lead to an efficient allocation of resources when the 
level of amenities differs across regions. 
The multiplier derived from cost-of-living differences (equation 6) 
does not lead to such an allocation, for two reasons.  First, when salaries 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
because before-tax income is equal across regions.  The efficient allocation is the same with or without 
an income tax. 
 88 For example, shifting one employee from Sunny to Gloomy will increase her real after-tax in-
come by $4000 and reduce the value of her amenities by $4000.  Thus, she is indifferent to the move.  
The Treasury is also indifferent because its tax revenue is exactly $10,000 both before and after the 
shift. 
 89 In general, differences in consumption amenities will be reflected in salaries when employees 
located in high-amenity regions are less productive than employees located in low-amenity regions; 
they will be reflected in living costs when employees located in high-amenity areas are just as produc-
tive.  See Gyourko et al., supra note 27, at 1420. 
 90 Progressivity in the rate schedule will reinforce this bias. 
 91 See supra pp. 1001–04. 
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fully reflect differences in amenities, equation 6 does not eliminate the inef-
ficiency.  In that situation, the multiplier makes no adjustment because the 
cost of living is the same across regions.  As described above, an adjust-
ment is required because nominal income, and hence taxes, are higher in 
low-amenity areas and lower in high-amenity regions,92 thus encouraging 
employees to consume more amenities rather than earn higher salaries.  
Second, when living costs fully reflect differences in amenities, the multi-
plier creates an inefficiency.  This occurs because equation 6 makes an ad-
justment when the allocation of resources across regions is already effi-
cient, since nominal taxes are equal across regions.93 
The multiplier derived from relative salaries (equation 5), in contrast, 
efficiently allocates resources when amenities differ among regions.  When 
living costs reflect the differential value of local amenities, no adjustment is 
needed because taxes are equal across regions,94 and equation 5 produces 
no adjustment because salaries are equal across regions.95  When differ-
ences in amenities are reflected in salaries, equation 5 is the efficiency-
producing adjustment, as shown in Table 9.96 
The equilibrium described by Table 9 is efficient because there is no 
way to shift employees across regions to produce a gain after compensat-
ing employees, owners of capital, and the Treasury.  That is because, de-
spite different nominal (and real) monetary incomes, taxes are equal across 
regions97 (as are, of course, returns to capital and the sum of after-tax in-
come and amenities).  Since differences in monetary incomes reflect dif-
ferences in the value of each region’s amenities, the multiplier, in effect, 
taxes the differential value of regional amenities.98  Thus, when we use the 
relative salary multiplier, the resulting equilibrium is efficient.  
TABLE 9.  20% ADJUSTED TAX AND AMENITIES REFLECTED IN SALARY: 
EMPLOYEE’S INCOME AND AMENITIES 
 Gloomy Normal Sunny 
Before-Tax Income $52,000 $50,000 $48,000 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See supra Table 6A, rows 1–2, supra p. 1009. 
 93 See supra Table 8, row 2, supra p. 1011. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. row 1. 
 96 Once again, Table 6B gives the corresponding figures for capital holders. 
 97 See supra Table 9, row 5, supra p. 1014. 
 98 As when living costs fully reflect amenities, the efficient allocation of resources is the same with 
a flat tax as with no tax.  This is true because $1 of revenue has the same purchasing power for taxpay-
ers and the government.  This assumes, however, that differences in living costs only reflect amenities.  
If there are cost-of-living differences unrelated to amenities, the purchasing power of $1 is not the same 
for the taxpayer and the government, so the efficient allocation of resources with a tax differs from that 
without a tax. 
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Cost of Living 1 1 1 
Relative-Salary  
Multiplier 
0.962 1 1.042 
Adjusted Taxable In-
come99 
$50,000 $50,000 $50,000 
Tax (20%) $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 
After-Tax Income $42,000 $40,000 $38,000 
Amenities ($2000) $0 $2000 
After-Tax Income plus 
Amenities 
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 
 
In an actual economy of any substantial size, there will likely be re-
gional differences in both living costs and amenities.100  As shown in this 
Part, equation 5 — the reciprocal of the region’s relative salary level — 
efficiently adjusts both for differences in regional living costs and for dif-
ferences in regional amenities.  This relative-salary multiplier works by en-
suring that the tax system imposes the same nominal tax on taxpayers with 
the same standard of living.101 
C.  Limits on the Ability To Adjust Salaries for Amenities 
The income tax, by taxing the differential value of regional amenities 
has the potential to reduce the misallocation of resources across regions.  
There are, however, limitations on the ability of the proposed tax adjust-
ment to capture the value of local amenities.  Three limitations are dis-
cussed in this section. 
The first limitation is that the tax imposed on the differential value of 
amenities is accurate only at the margin.  Individuals who value local 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 99 Adjusted taxable income equals the product of before-tax income (row 1) and the relative-salary 
multiplier (row 3). 
 100 See supra pp. 990, 1007–08. 
 101 The relative salary multiplier also eliminates another distortion created by an income tax that 
does not adjust for differences in regional amenities.  Such a tax encourages the development of new 
consumption amenities that are reflected in lower salaries and discourages the development of new con-
sumption amenities that are reflected in living costs (that is to say, rents and land prices) and new pro-
duction amenities that increase salaries.  The first type of investment is encouraged because benefits 
from new consumption amenities that are reflected in lower salaries reduce taxes, whereas investments 
of the last two types are discouraged because benefits from new consumption amenities that increase 
rents and land prices increase taxes, as do new production amenities that raise salaries.  By including the 
relative value of regional amenities in the tax base, an income tax that adjusts for differences in regional 
amenity levels can eliminate this distortion by subjecting the benefits from all three types of investment 
to tax. 
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amenities more than the marginal resident does are taxed not on their per-
sonal value, but only on the value of the amenities to the marginal resi-
dent.  For example, residents of Big Sur who would not move even if their 
salaries were cut in half are not taxed on the full value they place on their 
perch overlooking the Pacific Ocean.  Because they value living in Big Sur 
more than the marginal resident does, they do not affect the difference be-
tween salaries in the region and elsewhere.  Suppose, for example, that the 
marginal resident would be indifferent between earning $50,000 in Big Sur 
and earning $10,000 more in a region with average amenities.102  Resi-
dents of Big Sur who would be willing to accept a $25,000 reduction in 
income to live there will pay tax on only $10,000 of amenities, the value 
of living in Big Sur to the marginal resident. 
That result, however, is not unique to the enjoyment of regional ameni-
ties.  Precisely the same phenomenon occurs when individuals purchase 
goods for cash.  The most devoted fan of the Metropolitan Opera is “taxed” 
only on the actual amount he paid for the tickets, not on the much higher 
amount he would have been willing to pay.  Despite this, taxing the in-
framarginal value of amenities is not necessary to ensure the efficient allo-
cation of resources.  Inframarginal values do not affect the equilibrium 
wage, so they will not affect where individuals at the margin choose to 
live.103 
The second limitation is that the tax will be accurate only once equilib-
rium is established.  When the economy is not in equilibrium and people 
are relocating to take advantage of differences in living standards, the tax 
will not capture the value of amenities to the marginal resident.  For entry-
level and other highly fungible jobs, equilibrium might be established rela-
tively quickly, in which case any resulting error is likely to be small.  For 
positions that require in-depth local knowledge or local goodwill, however, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 102 Such a marginal resident would not leave Big Sur if the salary differential was $10,000 or less, 
but would leave if the differential was greater than $10,000. 
 103 To avoid biasing the decision whether to earn location-specific or non-location-specific income, 
efficiency requires taxing recipients of non-location-specific income on the value of amenities reflected 
in regional salaries.   
  The efficiency-producing multiplier for those who earn non-location-specific income separates 
the portion of the difference in relative salaries that compensates for living-cost differences from the 
portion that compensates for amenity differences.  Only the latter, the salary difference that compen-
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where Si is the relative salary, Ci is the cost of living, and τ is the tax rate.  The same multiplier, which is 
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it could take years to establish equilibrium, increasing the potential for er-
rors.104 
The third limitation is that it is impossible to adjust for differences in 
some regional amenities but not for others.  For example, it is impossible to 
adjust for regional differences in schools, but not for hours worked.  If the 
income tax is adjusted using the relative salary multiplier, then the implicit 
market value of all regional differences is captured by the tax system.105 
D.  Refining the Tax Base 
Subjecting the differential value of amenities to taxation would refine 
the personal income tax base.  Under current law, the tax base is roughly 
the cash income of taxpayers plus the market value of noncash goods and 
services received.106  Excluded from the base are amenities, working con-
ditions, prestige, job safety and security, and many other desirable and un-
desirable characteristics of work and life.  Commentators have debated for 
years the propriety and feasibility of taxing such attributes.107  This Article 
has shown that it is possible to tax the differential value of regional ameni-
ties without directly measuring their value.  If equivalent jobs can be identi-
fied across regions, then the differential value of amenities can be included 
in the tax base by imposing the same nominal tax liability on taxpayers 
with equivalent jobs in different regions regardless of actual income.108 
The idea is that the differential value of amenities can be measured in-
directly by using the implicit prices that people pay through different sala-
ries.109  The difficulty with this method is identifying equivalent jobs in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 104 However, the efficiency cost from any such errors is likely to be small because movement is ex-
pensive. 
 105 It might be possible to adjust for only selected amenities by using econometric techniques to esti-
mate the values of selected amenities, but that matter is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 106 Barter is included in income.  Fringe benefits are also included, unless they are explicitly ex-
cluded by statute. 
 107 The issue is usually described as mixing business and personal expenditures, and the debate is 
usually framed around what portion, if any, of the cost of these mixed expenditures should be deducti-
ble.  See generally Thomas D. Griffith, Efficient Taxation of Mixed Personal and Business Expenses, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1769 (1994); Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A 
Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1974); William A. Klein, The De-
ductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip — A Conceptual 
Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1966); William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: 
Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of “Simple” Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871 
(1969). 
 108 The value of amenities across regions might also differ across job categories.  For example, law-
yers, accountants, and their secretaries might all place different values on regional amenities.  These 
differences will be reflected in the market by salary differences across regions. 
 109 This indirect measurement is the idea behind the compensating differential model used regularly 
in regional economics.  The fundamental assumption is that workers and capital owners are both in 
equilibrium, so regional differences in wages and rents are compensated for elsewhere through ameni-
ties or government spending and taxing policy.  Gyourko et al., supra note 27, at 1416.  Over the last 
twenty years, a large body of literature has used empirical techniques to estimate the value of the 
amenities or government spending under the assumption that the market is in equilibrium.  For surveys 
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different regions.  Jobs are equivalent if individuals who accept the job in 
one region could obtain the job in another region, and vice versa.  The 
possibility of movement in both directions means that market forces will 
tend to push the two jobs toward providing employees with the same stan-
dard of living.  Collecting the same amount of tax from taxpayers who 
earn different salaries from jobs that differ only in their locations permits 
the differential value of regional amenities to be taxed.110 
Interestingly, including amenities (and other fringe or incidental bene-
fits) in the tax base would neither increase the aggregate dollar value of 
the base nor raise tax revenue.111  That is because only the differential 
value of amenities is included in the tax base.  By definition, the average 
of the differentials is zero, so neither the tax base nor the resulting tax 
revenue increases.  As a result, aggregate tax liability is reallocated across 
regions.  This reallocation could be expected to improve efficiency by 
eliminating the tax-induced bias against earning wages and in favor of re-
ceiving noncash compensation (such as prestige, leisure, and luxurious 
working conditions). 
VIII.  SHOULD TAXES BE ADJUSTED FOR DIFFERENCES IN LIVING 
COSTS AND AMENITIES? 
It is common in the tax literature to say that a tax system should be 
fair, feasible, and efficient.112  Earlier parts of this Article have focused on 
efficiency concerns.  This Part will briefly consider issues of fairness and 
feasibility. 
A.  Fairness 
The mobility of persons largely eliminates fairness arguments based on 
the differential taxation of persons residing in different regions.  Such 
movement tends to eliminate differences in living standards (the sum of 
after-tax real income plus amenities) between regions for individuals with 
similar skills and drive.  Thus, in equilibrium, the most common fairness 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of that literature, see Timothy J. Bartik & V. Kerry Smith, Urban Amenities and Public Policy, in 
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1207 (Edwin S. Mills ed., 1987) (for surveys 
through 1987); and Gyourko et al., supra note 27 (for surveys since 1987).  The method described in 
this Article would use those same techniques to assess tax liabilities.  However, instead of using those 
techniques to estimate the price implicitly paid, the method uses the assumption of equilibrium to 
equate jobs across regions so that their occupants can be assessed the same tax liability. 
 110 If there were other systematic differences across regions, such as in working conditions, these 
differences would be taxed as well. 
 111 Of course, if the increased efficiency from including amenities in the tax base translates into faster 
economic growth, then the inclusion of amenities will increase the tax base. 
 112 E.g., John B. Shoven & Paul Taubman, Saving, Capital Income, and Taxation, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 203, 203–04 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980). 
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argument — that similarly-situated taxpayers are taxed differently — is not 
valid.113 
The U.S. economy has long had a tax system that does not adjust indi-
viduals’ tax liabilities for differences in regional living costs and amenities.  
Thus, any incremental subsidy or tax resulting from that system has likely 
already been competed away and capitalized into wages and home prices.  
Consequently, adjusting taxes for differences in regional living costs and 
amenities would produce windfall losses for individuals living in areas 
where taxes would increase and windfall gains for individuals living in ar-
eas where taxes would fall. 
The magnitude of these windfalls, however, can be reduced by imple-
menting the changes slowly.  The longer the transition period, the smaller 
the windfalls.  Of course, the longer the transition period, the smaller the 
overall efficiency gains.  Nonetheless, the ability to limit windfalls blunts 
fairness arguments against implementing the adjustment.114 
B.  Feasibility 
There are several practical problems with developing a workable tax 
system that adjusts for differences in regional living costs and amenities.115  
This section first describes problems in calculating relative living costs, 
then problems in calculating relative salaries, and finally problems that ap-
ply to both.116 
1.  Problems in Calculating Relative Living Costs. — Although rea-
sonably good data is readily available on the cost of goods and services in 
different regions, it is far from easy to construct a measure of differential 
living costs.117  A report by the General Accounting Office described more 
than a dozen different methodologies for comparing living costs in differ-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 That argument is only valid during the transition, before the market has established a new equi-
librium. 
 114 A simple way of phasing in the transition slowly is to create a transitional multiplier equal to a 
weighted average of one and the regional multiplier.  For example, the weight assigned to the usual mul-
tiplier could increase by one-tenth each year, starting at one-tenth in the first year and reaching one (ten-
tenths) in the tenth year.  The corresponding weight assigned to one would decrease by one-tenth each 
year, starting at nine-tenths and reaching zero in the tenth year. 
 115 Incorporating progressivity into the tax schedule, however, is not among these problems.  To be 
taken seriously, the proposal to adjust taxes for differences in regional living costs and amenities must 
work with a progressive rate schedule.  (For not only is the current rate schedule progressive, but so are 
all versions of the flat tax that have been proposed in Congress.)  Fortunately, the adjustment is simple 
when the multiplier uses relative salaries ( Sim , equation 5, supra p. 1002).  In that case, the beginning 
and end points of each bracket are multiplied by the region’s relative salary, and the bracket’s tax rate is 
divided by the relative salary level.  (That is to say, the beginning and end points of each bracket are 
divided by the quantity in equation 5 and the tax rate is multiplied by the quantity in equation 5.) 
 116 Making the proper adjustment for all taxpayers requires information on both relative living costs 
and relative salaries.  See equation 5, supra p. 1002, and the first equation in note 103. 
 117 The problem of comparing a vector of prices at different times or for different places is well 
known in economics: it is called the price-index problem.  That problem is discussed briefly in Kaplow, 
supra note 7, at 188–89. 
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ent regions.118  Moreover, the cost of living is usually measured by the 
cost of purchasing a specific basket of goods and services.  Because the 
consumption basket typically changes with income, the relative cost of liv-
ing for consumers with different incomes can differ substantially across re-
gions.119  Thus, it might be necessary to have different cost of living 
measures for different income levels.120 
2.  Problems in Calculating Relative Salaries. — To compare salaries 
in different regions, we need data for a wide variety of occupations and 
salary levels.  The quality of that data is likely to be far less reliable than 
data on the cost of goods and services.  Apples must be compared to ap-
ples.  Such comparisons might be difficult for many occupations because 
individuals with the same title and even the same number of years of ex-
perience might have very different skills and levels of proficiency.  More-
over, those differences might vary systematically from region to region.121  
Furthermore, regional differences in salaries might be attributable to other 
differences that vary systematically, such as work effort.  In that case, sal-
ary would be undertaxed in regions where long work hours are common 
and overtaxed where work hours are shorter. 
3.  Problems in Calculating Both Variables. — Both the cost-of-living 
and the relative salary level adjustments require dividing the country into 
different regions.  The usefulness of the data increases as the regions are 
defined more narrowly.  However, the more narrowly the regions are de-
fined, the more burdensome the data requirements become. 
Another difficult problem is determining what portion of a taxpayer’s 
income should be adjusted for differences in living costs.  Is the division 
between earned and capital income a reasonable basis for estimating the 
portion of a taxpayer’s income that is location-specific?  Assuming that the 
labor-capital division is sound, can earned income be accurately distin-
guished from capital income?122 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 35, at 7 tbl.1. 
 119 This problem is likely to be especially acute for very high earners who probably spend a smaller 
portion of their income at the regional cost of living and a larger portion of their income on luxuries 
that are sold on the international market. 
 120 For example, ACCRA claims to calculate the cost of living for the top quintile of professionals 
and executives.  ACCRA COST OF LIVING INDEX, supra note 18, at i.  The problem of calculating mul-
tiple cost-of-living measures would not occur if equation 5, supra p. 1002, were used as the multiplier 
because relative salaries would take into account the earner’s likely consumption basket. 
 121 Systematic regional variation can create interesting incentive problems.  For tax purposes, it 
would be desirable to calculate the multiplier by comparison with lower-compensated, not higher-
compensated, individuals.  However, for business and prestige purposes, it is frequently desirable to 
make comparisons with higher-compensated individuals. 
 122 For a critical discussion of previous attempts in the tax law to distinguish earned and unearned 
income, see Michael Asimow, Section 1348: The Death of Mickey Mouse?, 58 CAL. L. REV. 801 
(1970).  The ordinary return on capital can be separated from earned income and the net present value 
of an investment.  However, the total return on capital (the ordinary return plus the net present value) 
cannot easily be separated from earned income and taxed at a different effective rate.  See Michael S. 
Knoll, Designing A Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1820–21 (1994) (arguing 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
Taxpayers pay tax on their nominal income without regard to their re-
gional cost of living or the value of their regional amenities.  Although the 
income tax’s failure to account for such differences has been criticized as 
unfair — because residents of high-cost and low-amenity regions pay 
higher taxes than residents of low-cost and high-amenity regions — that 
argument is unpersuasive because migration tends to eliminate regional 
differences in living standards.  However, failure to adjust for cost-of-
living differences is likely to misallocate resources across regions. 
There are two central misallocations.  First, the current tax system dis-
courages taxpayers from settling in high-cost regions where the high cost 
of living is matched by high earnings.  Second, the tax system discourages 
taxpayers from settling in low-amenity regions where the lower value of 
amenities is reflected in higher salaries rather than lower living costs.123  
Taxpayers are discouraged from settling in both types of regions because 
their nominal taxes will be higher.124 
Both misallocations can be eliminated by adjusting each taxpayer’s 
earned income (but not her unearned income) using the relative-salary 
multiplier, which is the reciprocal of the region’s relative salary level.  Ap-
plying the multiplier effectively taxes each resident on the marginal value 
(as determined by the market) of the region’s relative cost of living and its 
amenities, which would otherwise escape tax.  That multiplier thus im-
poses the same nominal tax on each resident without regard to her loca-
tion, thereby eliminating the tax-driven incentive for individuals to settle in 
what, under the current tax system, are low-tax regions. 
In sum, there is a strong efficiency argument in favor of adjusting taxes 
using the relative-salary multiplier.  There are also no strong fairness ar-
guments against making such adjustments.  There are, however, difficult 
implementation issues.  These problems are not necessarily insurmount-
able, but they warrant serious attention. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
that the cash-flow method of implementing a consumption tax is practicable, whereas the yield-
exemption method is not, because the former subjects the net present value (NPV) of an investment to 
tax at ordinary income rates, whereas the latter exempts the NPV from tax). 
 123 In effect, the residents of such high-amenity regions purchase their greater amenities with before-
tax dollars through lower salaries. 
 124 Taxpayers are neither encouraged nor discouraged from living in high-amenity regions in which 
the differential value of amenities is reflected in higher living costs (not lower salaries).  The reason is 
that these amenities are purchased with after-tax dollars through higher living costs. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I.  THE RELATIVE COST OF LIVING IN VARIOUS U.S. CITIES 
AS OF MID-2002 
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1.30 San Diego 
Juneau 






1.75 San Francisco 
2.20 New York 
 
The relative cost of living data is derived from ACCRA COST OF LIVING 
INDEX, No. 2, at 1.2–.12 (2002). 
APPENDIX II.  DERIVATION OF THE PROPER TAX MULTIPLIER 
This appendix derives the relative cost of living and relative salary 
multipliers — equations 5 and 6 — introduced in Part V.125 
The optimality condition for the tax adjustment requires that the nomi-
nal dollar value of taxes be equal across regions.  Thus, 
 
ττ imiS  =  , (8) 
 
where τ is the tax rate, Si is the relative before-tax salary in region i, and 





m 1=  or 
i
i m
S 1= , (9) 
 
which establishes the relative salary multiplier given in equation 5, which 
we call Sim . 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 See supra pp. 1001–04. 
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 Equilibrium for individual taxpayers implies that their after-tax real in-





mS )1(1 ττ −=− . (10) 
 
Substituting the optimality condition above for Si in the previous equation 








m , (11) 
 
which establishes the relative cost of living multiplier given in equation 6, 
which we call Cim . 
APPENDIX III.  THE PROPER TAX MULTIPLIER WHEN TAX REVENUE IS 
PARTIALLY SPENT PROVIDING GOODS AND SERVICES AT THE LOCAL 
COST OF LIVING 
As described in Part V, when the tax revenue raised from each taxpayer 
with location-specific income is not spent at that taxpayer’s local cost of 
living, efficiency requires that similar taxpayers pay the same nominal tax 
regardless of where they reside.  In contrast, when the tax revenue raised 
from each taxpayer with location-specific income is spent at the taxpayer’s 
local cost of living (so that its effectiveness is in inverse proportion to the 
taxpayer’s local cost of living), then in equilibrium, each taxpayer’s tax li-
ability is in direct proportion to her cost of living.  That is, efficiency re-
quires that real taxes on location-specific income be constant across re-
gions.  Denoting the multiplier when all tax revenue raised from location-
specific income is spent on goods and services at the same cost of living 







Sm ττ = . (12) 
 





m iC= . (13) 
 
For regions with the average level of amenities, the multiplier will 
equal 1.126  Thus, for regions with average amenities, the flat tax schedule 
needs no adjustment and real taxes are constant across regions.  For re-
gions with above-average amenities, the multiplier exceeds 1; for those 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 See supra Table 9, row 3, p. 1014. 
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with below-average amenities, it is less than 1.  In all cases, tax liability 
will be in proportion to living costs.127 
The tax revenue spent on employees at their local living costs might be 
less or more than the tax revenue raised from those employees.  Denote by p 
the ratio of the tax revenue spent on employees at their local living costs to 
the total tax revenue raised from such employees.  The remainder, 1 – p, is 
that portion of tax revenue raised from employees that is not spent at those 
employees’ local living costs.  The efficiency-promoting multiplier when a 
portion p of the tax revenue raised from employees is spent directly on 





i pmmp +− )1( . (14) 
 
The above multiplier is a weighted average of the multiplier when none 
of the revenue is spent at the taxpayers’ local living costs and the multi-
plier when all of the revenue is so spent.  The above multiplier reduces to 
S
im  when no tax revenue is spent at the taxpayers’ local cost of living; it 
reduces to Lim  when all tax revenue raised from location-specific income 
is spent at the local cost of living of the taxpayers from whom it is raised. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 If capital owners and those with non-location-specific income also receive benefits of equal real 
value that are purchased at their local costs of living, then efficiency requires that the real tax liabilities 
of taxpayers with the same nominal income be equal.  Thus, the efficient multiplier to apply to each tax-
payer’s income would be her local cost of living, Ci (not the reciprocal of her cost of living). 
